ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Originally grounded in an examination of civil and political inequalities, race literature has expanded in scope. Critical race theorists have begun to raise incisive questions about the origins of the massive social and economic disparities that persist to this day, issuing powerful calls for corrective efforts at redistribution like affirmative action and reparations. This development is a salutary one. But it is not only in the realm of social and economic disparities that this connection between past wrong and present impact is necessary.
The economic disparities that arise from past discriminatory policies limit not only substantive rights to control economic resources and enjoy educational and employment opportunities, but also political rights to participate in the democratic process. 2 This Article focuses on the current privately-funded campaign finance system to illustrate how the distribution of private property creates racial disparities in the political sphere. In Buckley v. Valeo, 3 the U.S. Supreme Court, concluding that money is needed for effective speech, curtailed the extent to which legislatures may restrict campaign contributions and spending on political activity. Discriminatory laws that have shaped the existing distribution of resources, 4 however, also restrict individual political expression and association. Studies reveal that although people of color comprise approximately 30% of the nation's population, 5 they represent only about 1% of those who make significant political contributions to federal campaigns. 6 In a political system that deems money to be necessary for effective speech, the allocation of economic resources shapes the distribution of political power no less than the location of the boundary lines that define legislative districts. 2 Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74-75, 75 n.* (1980) (distinguishing judicial review of substantive values, or "the designation of certain goods (rights or whatever)," from judicial review of process values, which "concerns itself with how decisions effecting value choices and distributing the resultant costs and benefits are made."). 3 424 U. S. 1 (1976) .
This Article does not promote or defend a particular remedy to this problem, such as reparations, affirmative action, or publicly financed campaigns.
7 Also beyond the scope of this Article are questions related to the significance of individual responsibility, the political feasibility and mechanics of remedial devices, and the constitutionality of such devices. 8 Instead, this Article illuminates the political function of property rights and asserts that discriminatory laws that impact the distribution of economic resources also affect the ability of people of color to exercise political liberties. 9 The impairment of political rights may be among the most troubling effects of discriminatory policies that have shaped the distribution of property, as political rights allow individuals to secure and preserve other substantive rights and opportunities. 10 Political rights also give individuals a sense of full citizenship within a community 11 and serve as a "vehicle for self-development and identification, and a means for creating alliances." 12 7 For a discussion of possible remedies in the campaign finance context, including application of the Voting Rights Act and an analysis of various campaign finance reform proposals, see Spencer A. Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) . Note that legislation recently passed by Congress will not prevent the existing distribution of private wealth from creating racial disparities in the political sphere. While the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 bans unlimited "soft" money contributions, the bill increases the amount of money an individual can give to a federal candidate to $2,000 from $1,000. 8 Some might argue that the U.S. Supreme Court would invalidate race-conscious remedial devices enacted to address historical and societal discrimination. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that "our Constitution is color-blind"). But see Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 336 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that "no decision of this Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind"). The Court has, in some cases, minimized the importance of past discrimination in its constitutional analysis. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ. 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1985) ("[S] ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."); Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989) ("While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond, Virginia."). In other cases, however, the Court has acknowledged the current impact of past discrimination. See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291, 293 n.9 (1969) (invalidating county's literacy test in part because the county's previous maintenance of a de jure segregated school system had "deprived its black residents of equal educational opportunities, which in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test," and finding "no legal significance" to the county's claim that some residents unable to pass the test were educated in other jurisdictions that maintained unequal school systems). 9 This Article focuses on the reality that, under current jurisprudence, the distribution of property affects the value of political liberties, and that critical race theorists should consider this reality when they make claims for distributive justice. Other works by the author use the lens of race to analyze campaign finance empirical data, constitutional issues, and reform legislation. See Spencer Overton, Voices From the Past: Race, Privilege, and Campaign Finance, 79 N.C.L. REV. 1541 (2001) (providing extensive data and discussion on the connection between past racial discrimination, existing income, wealth, and poverty statistics, and current contributions); Spencer A. Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002 ) (criticizing mainstream campaign finance reformers for ignoring racial realities connected to the distribution of property in their constitutional critique of existing jurisprudence and in their reform proposals).
This Article complements rather than subverts race theorists' efforts to emphasize socioeconomic disparities, for a recognition of how property rights function in the political arena leads to more comprehensive discussion about the racial misallocation of economic resources. Theorists can more clearly articulate the consequences of past discriminatory policies and tailor remedies to address these consequences. Indeed, discussions about political process may allow for meaningful exchange and progress when discussions about substantive entitlements are stalled, as many who tolerate economic disparities along racial lines may be less comfortable with political disparities. 13 Finally, an acknowledgment of the political function of property pierces the veil between wealthy private actors and facially race-neutral state actions that effectively perpetuate, and often exacerbate, racial disparities.
Part I of this Article reviews the literature of theorists who connect past discrimination to existing economic and social disparities. Part II examines the link between the exercise of property rights and effective political participation that served as the foundation of the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo. Part III explains that liberties are suppressed not only by government restrictions on the use and conveyance of resources on politics, but also by allocation rules that determine how decisonmaking authority over particular resources is ordered and distributed. Past discriminatory allocation rules hinder the extent to which many people of color contribute money to political campaigns and spend money on political expression. These rules also limit the extent to which people of color exercise political liberties in other contexts. For example, discriminatory allocation rules influence the ownership of media outlets, access to quality voting technology, and a host of other legal relationships that provide a greater opportunity to exercise political liberties to select populations. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 283, 284-85 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1993 ) (The Voting Rights Act "is premised on a broad vision of political equality and empowerment . . . that would value political participation for its own sake in order to recognize the autonomy and dignity of black voters. Participation would affirm their status as first-class citizens in a democracy."). REV. 443, 451 (1989) (explaining that the experience of participation in politics is valued "as a process of formation or field of exertion of self or community" through which "persons or communities (or both, reciprocally) forge identities.").
4
13 Note that the importance of political liberties may be attributable, in part, to the fact that courts afford the public lawmaking process much more discretion in regulating economic liberties than in regulating political liberties, such as an equally weighted vote and freedom of speech. Compare Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 & n.3 (1987) Race theorists have asserted that formal equality in civil and political rights is insufficient to alter racial hierarchy.
14 "Economic and social rights" the argument goes, should be viewed "as part of the tapestry of rights that are fundamental, in addition to civil and political rights." 15 The theorists claim that racial history and context should play a significant role in legal analysis generally. 16 Legal decisionmakers create and interpret laws, the race theorists argue, based on the false assumption that the settled distribution of property is "a legitimate and natural baseline," 17 and thereby mask the effects of past discriminatory policies that benefited whites. 1049, 1053-54 (1978) ("The perpetrator perspective presupposes a world composed of atomistic individuals whose actions are outside of and apart from the social fabric and without historical continuity.").
immigration from non-European countries 22 triggered racial disparities in control over resources. Policies that mandated segregation in education, employment, housing, and business exacerbated these disparities.
23
Even after courts invalidated facially discriminatory laws, structural phenomena such as intergenerational transfers of wealth 24 and depressed housing values in minority neighborhoods 25 have carried forward racial disparities in control over resources.
Current legal doctrines protect expectations over distributions of resources that have been shaped by past discrimination. They thus reinforce and "reproduce subordination in the present."
26 Such subordination manifests itself in the form of racial disparities in wealth, income, education, unemployment, mortality rates, incarceration rates, and other socioeconomic indicators. (2001) ("Critical race theory focuses on the persistence of conditions created by and traditionally associated with racist practice. Racism as traditionally practiced led to discriminatory exclusions from employment, from 'white' neighborhoods, from politics, from government contracts, and from universities like Texas, Michigan, and Berkeley."). 24 See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 42-53 (1999) (arguing that many racial inequities result from the disparities in accumulated family wealth). While assets conveyed at death are important and perhaps the most obvious way that people pass on wealth, wealth also flows from other types of intergenerational transfers, such as the "education, experiences, friendships, and contacts" a child obtains from parents. MELVIN L. OLIVER AND THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH / WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 152 (1995) . 25 See Richard Banks, Nondiscriminatory Perpetuation of Racial Subordination, 76 B.U. L. REV. 669, 689-90 (1996) REV. 1331 REV. , 1378 REV. -79 (1988 ("Yet the attainment of formal equality is not the end of the story. Racial hierarchy cannot be cured by the move to facial race-neutrality in the laws that structure the economic, political, and social lives of Black people."). Consequently, theorists argue, race-conscious policies such as affirmative action depart from the false neutrality of the status quo, 28 and are not unfairly discriminatory. 29 Theorists also use historical discrimination to justify reparations 30 and other legal changes that would improve the socioeconomic condition of people of color.
31
In setting forth these important socioeconomic insights, race theorists have necessarily moved beyond an exclusive focus upon civil and political inequalities. But in making this move, they need not -indeed, must not -abandon the language of political rights altogether. The residence."); see also Richard America, PAYING THE SOCIAL DEBT: WHAT WHITE AMERICA OWES BLACK AMERICA 19 (1993) (discussing various models for calculating the debt of past discrimination and estimating that the figure may be between five and ten trillion dollars); Anthony E. Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959, 1011 (2000) ("In the case of African-Americans, some economists have calculated the debt for the unpaid wages of slavery plus accumulated interest to be over four trillion dollars."). 28 Cf. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1782 (1993) ("The focus on innocent whites changes the affirmative action inquiry from one of rectifying the harm to Blacks to invoking legal protection for the rights of whites who are innocent of discriminatory acts, although they have benefitted from prior discrimination."). 79, 132-33 (2001) (suggesting that the law require health care providers who receive funding from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to report data on medical treatment by race and ethnicity in order to address issues of racial disparities in medical research and treatment).
political function of property, as discussed below, reveals that economic liberties and political liberties are closely interrelated.
II. THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY
While the concept of property serves a variety of functions related to general welfare, productivity, and development, property also serves a political function. 32 In Buckley v. Valeo, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court accorded heightened protection to an owner's right to use and convey resources to engage in political expression and association.
33
As theorists have long recognized, property is not a set of "things." It is a cultural and legal creation that, like a bundle of sticks, encompasses various entitlements to control resources.
34
These entitlements often include the privilege to use resources, the right to prevent others from using the resources without consent, and the power to transfer resources. 35 Classical liberal theorists conceptualize property as embodying an owner's absolute ability to control a particular resource to the exclusion of the rights of others.
36 Modern theorists, however, recognize that an owner's entitlements are not always absolute. 143, 151 (1996) that arise from constitutions, statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions qualify the extent to which society will respect of an individual's right to use, convey, or otherwise control a particular resource for a particular function.
38
In Buckley, the U.S. Supreme Court extended to individuals expansive rights to use, control, and convey financial resources to communicate political messages.
39
Buckley involved a challenge to expenditure and contribution limitations contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (the "1974 Act"). 40 Invoking the First Amendment, the Court invalidated an array of expenditure limitations, including provisions that limited the amounts that could be spent by a campaign, by a candidate from her personal funds, and by a noncandidate on behalf of a candidate. 41 In contrast, the Court upheld contribution limits, ("While the post-Realist conception of real property is no longer built on a regime of absolute rights in these entitlements, the bundle of sticks conception of property has failed to infiltrate the absolutist regime governed by intellectual property laws."). 1667, 1678 (1988) ("Every regulation of any portion of an owner's 'bundle of sticks,' is a taking of the whole of that particular portion considered separately. Price regulations 'take' that particular servitude curtailing free alienability, building restrictions 'take' a particular negative easement curtailing control over development, and so on.").
Just as property commentators have described the rights associated with property as arising from legal directives, democracy scholars have noted that democracy does not consist simply of individual citizens exercising political liberties in a neutral, prepolitical world; rather, democracy is also shaped by institutional and legal structures that determine the boundaries of possible political outcomes. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1-2 (1998) (stating that "[t]he kind of democratic politics we have is always and inevitably itself a product of institutional forms and legal structures" which "limit and define the decisions available through democratic politics itself"). A racial analysis reveals that laws governing property and laws governing democracy are not mutually exclusive, but overlap to shape both the meaning of property and the meaning of democracy. The rules and doctrines that govern democracy, such as the Court's invalidation of expenditure limits in Buckley, shape the contours of property rights. At the same time, the rules and doctrines that govern property, such as past discriminatory allocation rules, shape the contours of democracy. 39 See Daniel A. Farber, Property and Free Speech, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1999) ("Property, as first-year law students learn, is like a 'bundle of sticks,' composed of various powers, rights, and immunities. Among those sticks is the capacity to use property for communicative purposes -either directly, as when we post a sign on our front lawn, or indirectly, as when we use money to pay for a newspaper ad."). In the first 150 years of the existence of the United States, property served other political functions. Property was seen as the basis for liberty, and thus property rights were less prone to political reallocation. Further, many jurisdictions conditioned the franchise on property ownership because of the assumption that property holders could best exercise independent judgment. See D. HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSACHUSETTS, 1765 -1780 371 (1977 (observing that at the time of the American Revolution, "[p]roperty was the basis for liberty. According to contemporary ideology, it made men independent from the influence of others."); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 907 (1998) ("Originally . . . property qualifications were thought to promote a vital goal: ensuring that voters had a stake in political matters and exercised independent political judgment."). 40 See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 , Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976 9 41 The expenditure limitation provisions were as follows: (1) a $1,000 annual ceiling on independent expenditures (expenditures by a noncandidate to promote the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate), see 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976), (2) an annual ceiling on campaign expenditures from a candidate's personal or family funds, see 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976), and (3) a variable ceiling on total campaign expenditures from all sources, see 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (Supp. IV 1974 ) (repealed 1976 ). This Article is limited to a discussion of the portion of the 1974 Act concerning campaign contributions and expenditures. Buckley also invalidated regulatory provisions providing for appointments to the Federal Election Commission by congressional leaders (based on the separation of powers doctrine), see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-41 (1976) , and upheld disclosure provisions, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) , and public financing provisions, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109 (1976) . For important literature providing additional information on Buckley and the campaign finance dilemma generally, see CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK (Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, Trevor Potter & Frank Sorauf eds., 1997) (providing a broad overview of campaign finance including a provision that prohibited individuals from contributing more than $1,000 to a candidate for federal office.
42
The Court deemed individuals to have an absolute right to exercise proprietary liberties 43 in spending resources to produce political communication. 44 In explaining its holding, the Court emphasized the essential function of property in exercising expressive and political liberties, stating that:
[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech. 45 The Court reasoned that spending money is so closely connected to effective political communication that expenditure limits restrict the use "of virtually every means of communicating information."
46 Therefore, the Court concluded, any restriction on expenditures impermissibly restricted political communication.
Although the Court did not extend to individuals such extensive rights to contribute financial resources to campaigns, the Court prohibited excessive legislative restrictions on the exercise of these liberties. The Court upheld the $1,000 contribution limits, reasoning that contributions were not as closely related to expression as expenditures 47 needed to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption. 48 Despite this holding, the Court noted that contribution restrictions must not be too extensive because of "the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns." 49 The Court observed that effective campaigning relies on broadcast and newspaper advertisements, mass mailings, and polling operations, all of which are often made possible by contributions. 50 With regard to associational interests, contributions enable "like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals." 51 Because contributions allow candidates and political committees to amass resources necessary for political dialogue, the Court determined that contribution limits must be sufficiently high so as not to interfere with the ability of candidates to engage in effective advocacy.
52
The Court extended enhanced protection to the exercise of property rights to make expenditures and contributions because of the unique values associated with political expression and association. According to the Court, these property rights were necessary to promote the "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." 53 The Court stated that such an exercise of property rights promotes the "interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." 54 The exercise of such rights ensures that "the people-individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political committees-. . . retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign." 1, 26 (1976) ("Under a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy."). 51 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) . 52 See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000) (concluding that a contribution limit is unconstitutional when it is so low as to "impede the ability of candidates to 'amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy'" and "render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)). In Nixon v. Shrink, the Court explicitly reviewed contribution limits using a standard of scrutiny that was more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but "different" from the strict scrutiny applied to expenditure limits. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385-87 (2000) . But see Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and "The Thing that Wouldn't Leave," 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 483, 496-97 (2000) (asserting that Shrink's test to establish that contribution limits are unconstitutionally low "will be exceedingly difficult for challengers to meet" and therefore suggesting that the test functions as a rule). 
III. DISCRIMINATORY ALLOCATION RULES LIMIT THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL LIBERTIES
In drawing an explicit connection between the use of wealth and political liberty, the Court in Buckley made apparent a crucial argument that advances the critical race project. Following the reasoning of Buckley, past discriminatory laws inevitably impair the ability of people of color to exercise rights over economic resources to participate in the political process.
In addition to rules that restrict or protect one's control over her property, allocation rules "structure people's opportunities and incentives to obtain and use resources."
56 Allocation rules are not pre-political, but instead are shaped by culture, history, and politics, 57 and essentially determine how decisionmaking authority over particular resources is organized and distributed. 58 Consequently, allocation rules are related to individual exercises of substantive liberty in that they establish "the framework within which liberty exists."
59 Those who have benefited from allocation rules are able to exercise liberties related to property for political purposes, while those who have not benefitted are unable to do so. Thus, allocation rules are inextricably tied to the value of liberty associated with property, and determine the value of one person's liberties relative to those of another.
60 Allocation rules are no less important to the value of liberty than rules that directly restrict or expand the formal exercise of property rights.
61
The Court has recognized that biased allocation rules can unfairly disadvantage particular actors in their exercise of political liberties. In contrast to the First Amendment absolutism of Buckley, the Court tolerated expenditure limitations in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. 62 In Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations from using money from their general treasuries to make contributions or expenditures on behalf of candidates. To the Court, special allocation rules, such as "limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets," 63 gave corporations "legal 56 C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 766 (1986) . 57 See C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 743 (1986) ("Culture, history, and politics (broadly defined) necessarily determine both the content of the specific property rules accepted in a given society and the resulting property allocations. I will here assume what I think should be obvious: that the notion of a complete set of timeless, natural, or proper property rules is absurd.").
58 See C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 779-80 (1986) (observing that "'allocation rules,' determine who is entitled to make and carry out any particular decision. They embody the criteria that identify the possessor of a property right, that is, the possessor of decisionmaking authority. . . ."). 68 Nonetheless, the case recognizes that allocation rules determine the value of expressive and proprietary liberties and may warrant legislative intervention that reallocates the value of these liberties.
69
In addition to laws that give special benefits to corporations, allocation rules include past racially discriminatory laws that have shaped the distribution of property, along with laws and practices that have carried racial disparities forward. Because of discriminatory allocation rules, many whites are more able and more likely to exercise liberties related to property for political purposes, while many people of color are less able and less likely to do so. S. 652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.) (Asserting that it is a "fallacy that the source of the speaker's funds is somehow relevant to the speaker's right of expression . . . "); FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (invalidating a congressionally imposed ban upon editorializing by noncommercial broadcasting stations that receive federal funds, reasoning that under the statute, the station "is barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its editorial activity."). 70 The failure of minorities to make political contributions is more attributable to a lack of resources than a lack of desire to donate money. NOVEMBER 1, 2000 NOVEMBER 1, , at 1 (2000 [hereinafter CENSUS they represent only about 1% of those who make reportable contributions to federal candidates. 73 Residents in the average American zip code make federal contributions at three times the rate of residents in zip codes populated predominantly by people of color. 74 The 41.3 million inhabitants of America's 2492 predominantly nonwhite zip codes collectively gave less money than the 680,000 inhabitants of the twenty-six zip codes with the highest rates of giving. 75 Even elected officials who represent districts that are populated predominantly by people of color tend to receive most of their campaign money from white contributors. 76 Thus, the nature of political debate in minority communities "is largely dependent on the behavior of whites." 77 While limitations on large contributions and expenditures restrict the liberty of some individuals, discriminatory allocation rules restrict the political liberties of many people of color in contravention of the reasoning of Buckley. Because of the crucial role that money plays in political communication, the rules disadvantage many people of color in "virtually every means of communicating ideas."
78 People of color have less access to "indispensable instruments of effective political speech" 79 such as television, radio, and other mass media outlets. People of color control fewer resources and are thus less able to pool resources with like-minded persons in furtherance of common political goals. Discriminatory allocation rules also hinder fundraising and effective advocacy by those candidates that people of color support.
80 Such discriminatory allocation rules prevent "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" 81 and prevent an "interchange of ideas" that will bring about "political and social changes desired" by many people of color. 82 The rules thus hinder individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-determination of people of color.
83
Although this Article focuses on campaign finance to illustrate how past discriminatory allocation rules infringe on the present value of both the economic liberties and the political liberties of people of color, these harms are much broader. Even outside of the campaign finance context, discriminatory allocation rules infringe upon the ability of people of color to exercise political liberties. 84 First, past discrimination impairs the extent to which people of color spend money to exercise other, related political liberties. For example, on the whole, whites are better positioned to pool their resources and hire a lobbyist or purchase airtime to promote their personal opinions on affirmative action, criminal sentencing, and other general political issues. Such spending on lobbying and "issue advertisements" may significantly impact legislative outcomes. Further, wealthier whites disproportionately own and control major newspapers and television news operations, and thus people of color exercise minimal control over endorsements, editorials, and news reports that discuss candidates and ballot initiatives. Similarly, people of color own and control few book publishing companies, recording companies, movie studios, and other major entities that produce expression. Through a barrage of images related to language, conduct, and values, these entities enjoy significant influence not simply over election results and government policy, but also over the meaning of racial identity (as understood by people of color as well as by whites). 85 Due to a lack of ownership and other legal relationships that allow for control of 476, 484 (1957) ). 83 While Buckley allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the harms caused by discriminatory laws that have deprived many people of color of resources, the opinion is troubling in the absence of some sort of redistribution that offsets past discriminatory allocation rules. Another way to view this problem, at least in the campaign finance context, involves a focus on not merely the discriminatory allocation rules themselves, but on the decision in Buckley to defer to a distribution of resources shaped by discriminatory allocation rules as a baseline for political participation. The Buckley Court constitutionalizes a right to exercise control over resources for political expression that is parasitic on discriminatory allocation rules that we would today consider unconstitutional. Without some form of redistribution of liberties, Buckley effectively advances the political ideologies of those who have profited from the discriminatory misallocation of property. Indeed, Buckley's additional protection of settled expectations is in itself an allocation rule. The decision multiplies the rights associated with property ownership and expands disparities between those who have benefited from past discriminatory allocation rules and those who have not. Along similar lines, if property is an aspect of social relations between people that focuses on "rights" rather than "things," recognition of the political function of property contribute to a better understanding of how these "rights" shape social relations in the context of a democracy. (2000) ("Under the influence of radical feminism and critical race resources used for expression, people of color are hindered in their ability to counter oppressive images effectively in the marketplace of ideas. Further, people of color are less able to demand alternative programming because they do not form a high-end target audience for advertisers. 86 Second, past discriminatory allocation rules effectively interfere with the opportunity of many people of color to cast a vote. Certain technologies, such as optical scanning machines that more accurately record votes and Internet voting programs that allow individuals to vote from home, may appear to open the process and allow for enhanced participation. Just as individuals who have benefited from discriminatory allocation rules are better equipped to pay poll taxes, own property, 87 and pass literacy tests, 88 however, they also may have greater access to optical scanning machines and Internet voting.
89 Thus, such technologies may skew the distribution of political liberties. 90 To the extent that incarceration rates correspond with poverty, felon restrictions, it follows that discriminatory allocations that interfere with the ability of people of color to use resources for politics deserve closer examination.
